Prevention of design flaws in multicomputer systems by unknown
NASA CR-

FLAWS N76-23889(NASA-C-1'7657) PFEVENTIGN OF DESIGN 
SYSTEMS (tcDonnell-Dcuglas
IN NULTICCMPUTEB 

Technical Services) 114 p HC $5.50 CSCL 09B Unclas
 
.G3/61 41452
 
PREVENTION OF DESIGN FLAWS
 
IN 
MULTICOMPUTER SYSTEMS 
2W'/s-Dv'cocvo­
:*972 
PRICES SUBJECT TO CHA1A$L 
iVAS 9-/;5¢7a 
BYREPRODUCED 
NATIONAL TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OFCOMMERCE 
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19760016801 2020-03-22T15:48:21+00:00Z
NOTICE 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED FROM THE 
BEST COPY FURNISHED US BY THE SPONSORING 
AGENCY. ALTHOUGH IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT CER-
TAIN PORTIONS ARE ILLEGIBLE, IT IS BEING RE-
LEASED IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING AVAILABLE 
AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE. 
- -
Page 
APPENDIX I - zLEcTzBTATIC !'I----.. . . .. . ... 30' 
APPZ.NDIX II DO-10O ".7UT SYSTEM .41 
APPENDIX III- L-1011 CGUTE. SYS-. .. 
APPE-ODIX IV - B COMETER SYSTz. ..... 52 
APPENDIX V. - DO-IO D-'ITAL P-D ..UT- S. . .V.55 
APPB2DIX VI - PA CcMTUTEh SYSVV ..... 57 
APPENDIX VII F-80, CM-UTE? . ... 6o- 5 TShk ..... ....... 
APPENDIX VIl r-15 :z-UTER S:&TZM . . 70 
APPEbZDIX Ix - F-h PLY-BY-WmEs .. . 72 
APPEN51X -X - F'-14 ~0CI-UTE STM ......... .. 7 
APPENDIX XI - P-111 ZZTTUTEE SYSTEM ..... 76 
APPENIX xIi S x --.P...E __ , ,-.. . . . .. . 78 
APPENDIX XIII - TASS COMPUTh . .. .. . . . 81 
APPENDIX XIV - YT-i, CUTE SYSTE. . 85 
APPENDIX XV - ADVA-l ,!UTE- SYS=v . . 88 
APPEN IX XVI - SHUTTLE 2'AIN 2Z . . . 91 
APPENDIX XIVII - SAF.N V iNS r E 93U UNIT .U.RSYSTEM 
APPENDIX XVIII - GRO=, CgYSTEMS . . .... .... 98 
• APENDI'- PP' 
' XV!!"UM­

DRIGIhTAf MUMflT 
or,, POOOR iTLDLA2zPAGZBO 
Nv 
LIST 	 OF FIGURES


Figure 	 'Page


.	1. 	 SEtKICONDUCTOR DEVICE OPERATING LEVELS .. . . . 7 
2. 	 Gl NRATED NOISE STRENOTH VS FFS2UENOY . .. .. .. . 36


5. NORMALIZED NOISE SPECTRUM FROM AIRCRAIFT TRAILING EDGE .37


4; TYPICAL DC-JO - FOUR CqiANh.L\ : SYSTEM ........E  43


5. -DO-IO SIMPLIFIED AUTOMATIC PILOT BLOCK DIAGRAM . . . . 44


6. 	 DO-1 AUTOMTIO FLIGET CONTROL SYSTEM. .. . .... . 45


7. 	 L-1011 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM 	 51..........5


8. 	 B-I FLIGHT CC TROL SYSTEM ..... .............. 	 . 54


9. 	 F'-80 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTEM MECHANIZATION ; 62


10. 	 DIGITAL SYSTRM! FAILURE DSTECTIO1 AND REPORTInG SYSTEM 64


11. 	 S-5A DATA .kANAG4SNT SUBSYSTEM ." ........... . . 80


12. 	 TAGS FLIGHT CCNTFROL SYSTEM .... ............ 83


13. TAGS OONFIGURATIONBLOCK DIAGRAM ....... . ..... 84


1I. YF-16 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM . ......... .. . 87


15. 	 ADVANCED STUDIES CANDIDATE SYSTE. USING QUAD OOMEUTERS. 90


16. 	 INSTRUMENT UNIT NAVIGATION, GUIANCE AND CONTOL 95


SYSTEm,1B1OK DIAGRAM .. ....... .. .... . .. 95


17. 	 INSTRUMENT UNIT LAUNCH VEEHICLE DIGIT.L COMPUTER


(LVDx) SWITCH SELECTCR INTERCCNSOTIO- DIAGRAM . . . 97


V 
LIST OF TABLES


Table Page 
I. ELECTRONIC DEVIGE SUSCEFTIBILnIY LEVELS ....... 8


II. RADAR INTEEFEREiCE SCURCES ........... . 1


III. CPONEAT SUSCEPTIBILITY TO IHTNING . .... . 13


IV. CO PUTER SWITCEING APPROACHES .......... 20


,low. 
- LIST OF AO?.ONTYS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A ..... *...................... 
Area
AFO .......... Automatic flight control


AYX-s ......................... Amplifiers


An .................. .... Acceleration, normal


-C............... ........... Capacitance


CADO ......................... Central Air Date Computer
 

COATS ................... 1.... Comman Oommunications 
 and
 
Telemetry System


ODP .......................... Central Data Processor


1DS .......................... Commands


COND ......................... Condition


CSN........................... Command Service Module


CTS ......................... Control Transfer $ystem


d . Distance


db ........................... Decibel


dbw ........................... Power in decibel relative to


one watt


JDA .......................... Digital differential analyzer


DDSU ......................... Display Drive Select Unit


. ................ Permittivity


EOU .......................... Electronic Control Unit


Ef ........................... Energy of one spark discharge


for flashover


vii


Eo ......................... Permlttivity of free space 
E .......................... Enery'of one spark discharge 
for punch-through 
f ............................ Frecuescy 
FCo ........................... Flight Control System
 

FO/FO/FS ...................... Fail operational/fail


operational/fail safe


ft ............................ Feet


GHz .......................... Gigahertz


GS ........................... Goddard Spac& Center


I ............................ ntezrated circuit


ILS.......................... Instrument Landing System


INS ........................... Inertipl Navieation System


INST .........................
 Instructions 

lop ......................... 
 Input output processor


IU .......................... 
 Instrument Unit 

SC .......................... 
 Lynion B. Johnson Space Center


1Hz ........................... Kilohertz


KSO ..................... ....John F. Kennedy Space Center


KV ........................... Kilovolts


KW ........................... Kilowatts


LOO .......................... launch Control Center


LH ........................... Left hand


Li ........................... lunar Module


viii


LVDA......................... Launch Vehicle Data Adapter


LVDO ......................... Launch Vehicle Digital Computer


LVDT'e ....................... Linear vaiable differential


transformers


LUT .......................... Launch Umbilical Tower


i..............................Meter


Y0O .......................... Mission Control Center


z........................... egahertz


YOCR ..........................ission Operations Control Room


MOS .......................... Metal oxile silicon


YOSFFT ........................ Metal oxide silicon field


effect transistor-
MSBL ........................ Microwave Scanning Eeam Landing System 
maee ......................... Milliseconds 
% ........................... Megawatt 
NASA ......................... National Aeronautics and


Space Administration


NM ........................... Nautical mile


P ............................ Precipitation


PAFA.......................... Performance and Failure


Assessment Monitor


pk ........................... Peak


PSU/SP ....................... Prmeter Setting Unit/Status


Panel


Ix


Q............................ Charge in coulombs


RD .......................... Research ant development


F ........................... Radio frequency


P3.. . . .. t band


I.......................... .* eusable surface insulation


RTICO .......................... Real Time Cczruter Complex


......................... tability AuzMentation System


SIP ......................... Strai Isoleotion Pa&


so. ......................... Square mile


Sys . System


TAU.Sh ........................ Tactical Air Navi-stion


TAGS ......................... Tletia " dbreGtIc Syse
TAGS * acicl Airborne- Guidance Sstem 
TILs ...... Tactical Instru-mea' To A z System 
.. Telemetry 
TM .......................... Triple modular re!iiancy


TPS .......................... Therm-al Protection System


SYYBOL.S


........................... Pitch rate


,/ ...° .. ........... .. °.M c o


*...icro
....


s ........................... .icrcseco- ds


7 ........................... Iicrcvolts


2i'.-j jjAf pAGE 12 
Generic design flaws of redundant computer systems can


result in undes'irable operation, such as monopolization of


computer controlled data buses by a faulty element, accidental


system shutdown due to trsnsiefhts, erroneous mezory alteration, 
loss of control system equalization, and software oversights,


which can be common in all redundant strings.


History 's.. shown that generic design failures have occurred 
on aerospace vehicles.. On aircraft, these problems have resulted 
in simultaneous malfunctioning of multiple redunlant computers 
requiring faultdown to the mechanical cable flight control system. 
The system features that cause generic design failures are s ­
ceptibility of electronic circuits to electromagnetic or electro­
static energy, susceptibility of interfacing per llel redundant 
electronic strings to multiple string failures, and computer 
oversights causing ccm-on failures within each string. 
The low-power solid state integrated circuit (10) devices 
are much more-susceptible to oxtrn...-selectromagnetic and 
.electrostatic interference than their earlier counterpart, the 
discrete transistor. This means that special precautions'must be 
taken to preclude generic design failures of these susceptible 
electronic components on the Shuttle. 'Analyses indichte that the 
licrowave Scanning Beam Lsnling System .(MSBLS) ground station 
will most probably not interfere with the electronic circuits.
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However, the high power AN4/FPS-16 radar tracking system will


Interfere with the electronic circuits unless about 60 decibels


(ib) of attenuation (vehicle skin plus cable) to interference is


achieved.


Experience has sh-m that vehicle skin will attenuate RF


energy by abcut 15 db without spec al design considerations; 
while 40-45 db of skin attenuation can he achieved, (at least on 
stall vehicles) with special design considerations. Braided type'


cable shielding can typically provide up to 0db ofshielding to


RS energy with special design considerations'(e.g. 560 degree


seals, similar to waveguide connectors, at the connectors). 
l-glhtning is, however, a more difficult noise source to 
protect azainst thea radare. Shieldinz levels of 70 to 100 db 
are required to provide the most sensitive !Cs protection against 
lizhtning. 
The mechanism for pickup of electrcsgnetic energy is


through external skin cracks (e.g. bolt holes even with bolts


installed) and internal cable bundles. Therefore, better


shielding of the black-box enclosure is Eenerally of no help. No


* attetpt was made in this report to estimate or calculate the


a-ount'af skin and cable attenuation to be prcvided by the current


Orbiter design. However, cut-cute in the metallic.skiti that are


fitted with low dielectric constant zaterial for antenna windows


could reduce the skin attenuation tc near zero db,unless the
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design of the antenna and antenna system mounting structure 
precludes leakage of F- energy to the inside of the Orbiter. 
Skin w-th virtually no attenuation to . radiation could make the 
Orbiter electrical cczpcnents very susoetible to RF signala. 
The Orbiter is Judged uniquely vulnerable to electrostatic 
charge hazards because of the high electrical resistivity and 
large surface areas of its Reusable Surface Ineilation (ESI) 
which is in nroximity to inherently susceptible solid state 
dizital avionics couiprment. Additional NASA Avionics System 
En ineering Division effort has been initiet6d to further define 
this oroblem and to generate solutions. 
An aircraft coputer switching philosophy used on operational 
syste s has been diztilled by surveying existing systems. Key


points of this philosorhy are: 
a) Plan for failures-by using a deter-inistic design 
-approach that ssumes failures will hapren (Murphy's 
law). Do not rely on a reliability number (such 
as .999) alone. 
b) Functional redundancy is preferred to' hardware 
redundancy only. 
c) Reconfigure by turning devices off rather than on. 
d) Avoid synthesis of a viable system from several. 
strings. The pilot needs an easily understandable 
equipmeant confizurstion. Easeof understanding is 
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best achieved by switchinz entire strings of electronic


equipment.


e) 	Confirm failures before -disconnectingeouipment when


possible to preclude usi7,g up configuration options


too fast and to allow the crew to function in the


decision process.


f) 	Permit several levels of degraded performance to


preclude using up options too fast. 
Items a) thru d) appear to be applicable to the Orbiter while 
e) and f) may not be applicable due to:the greater time criti­
callity of the Orbiter functions and the higher Orbiter perform­
anPe requirements. 

Table IV on pae 20 proviaes a summa-ry of computer switching 
approaches for some of the existing aircraft snd. spacecraft 
systems surveyed. ) It ves found that "ost ytems are designed to 
prohibit g&neric failures and/or are not similar eno-agh.to the 
Shuttle.systems to merit further ztudy. This is indicated from 
the followingi system characteristics. 
a)'Some systems use dedicated ccmputers for different 

functions.


b),Many systems are simplex in nature.


p) Some systems use manual break-lefore-make switching


for computers.


d) Many syptews are all tenao= in nature and many
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use no data buses.


It As found that the airborne systems were more applicable


than the ground systems. In particular the D,-10 with its


functional redundant performance and failure assessment monitor


(PAFAM) system and the S-5A with its cross strapped computer
 

systems, are of interest.


Examples of: computer system shutdowns due to transientsw


errors in parallel computational strings due to failures of


interfacing elements, and multicomputer shutdowns due to computer


programming oversights were found in the course of this study.


However, no examples were found of monopolization'of data buses


or erroneous memory allocation due to generic system failures.


No aircraft systems were found that use an integrated data


bus approach to handle both flight critical functions and most


other major vehicle functions, as done on the Orbiter. The only


aircraft found that plans to use a fly-by-wire control system


in its operational phase, without the availability of a mebhenical


cable backup flight control system, is the new YF-16 light weight 
fighter-aircraft. This aircraft has been flown hundreds of


flights without accident due to failure of the all electonic


flight control system.
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1.0 Introduction-

This study wAs conducted at the request of and under the


direction of the NASA Avionics System Engineering


Division. The purpose of the study was to investigate multi­

computer configurations and redundancy management techniques to


determine methods to prevent and/or treat generic design flaws. 
For the purpose of this report generic design failures are de­

fined as undesirable operations of redundant computer configura­
tions which are typified as follows:


. -e-monopolization of all or many data buses by a faulty


computational element in one or more strings


o accidental subsystem/system shutdon due to transients


e erroneous memory alteration (overlay) due to


crosstalk between ccmnutere


o loss of'control equalization where equalization is


required for normal operation


* software ovetsights which can be common in all


redundant operational strings


This report covers the first portion of the psychotic ccm­

.puter study in which generic flaws are defined and the prevention


and treatment of generic design failures are discussed. The


computer configurations and redundancy manegement of existing


aircraft, spacecraft, and industry computer systems are also


reviewed. The purpose of this review is to assimilate the best


existing ccmputer system philosophy guidelines for use on the


fhuttle program. The existing systen are investigated to deter­

mine computer redundancy configurations, redundancy switching 
criteria, and immunity to generic design flaws. --
The second portion of the generic design flaw study is to


include an Orbiter redundant computer analysis to define and


solve specific Orbiter generic design problems. This portion of


the study is to be conducted after completion of this report


with the results being in a separate report.


This report is mainly comprised of information previously'


published in preliminary working papers. The source of data for


this report includes both written,reports from and telecons with


the appropriate companies and engineering staffs responsible for


'the investigated aircraft, spacecraft, and industrial computer


systems. Written references used are included in the list of


references..


History bas shown that computer generic design flaws have


occurred on aerospace vehicles. On aircraft these problems have


resulted in malfunctioning of the multiple reduniant computer


systems re-quiring faultdown to the mechanical cable flight


control system. For example, on TAGS (Tactical Airborne


Guidance System)the entire computer system (three.computers)


shut down due to a software design oversight requiring reversion


to mechanical cable flight control to preclude a crash. The
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software was not designed to handle a second computer failure


before three comPuter'computstional cycles elapsed due to an


oversight in the computer program ienign. On the JD-1O the quad


redundant analog flight control system comparators were unable.


to detect a bias in the yaw flight control channel since all


channels included the bias due to a part failure and a design


weakness. However, an independent monitor system, the performance
 

and failure assessment monitor (PAFA51), detected this generic


failure allowing manual takeover using the mechanical cable


system. These generic failure examples were found in the course


of this study and do not represent a complete listing. Other


failure examnles are included in other report sections. A


special survey to find failure examples was nbt made since the


time to document more failures was not felt to be warranted and 
in most instances manufactures are reluctant to !release a.ny 
information regarding failures of their systems.


Examples of: computer system shutdowns due to transiebts,


errors in parallel computationsl strinas due to failures of


interfacing elements, and multicomputer shutdowns due to computer 
programming oversights were found in the course of this study.


However, no examples were found of monopolization of data buses


or erroneous memory allocation due to generic system failures.


No aircraft systems were found that use an integrated data


bus approach to handle both flight critical functions and most


-3­

other major vehicle functions, as done on the Orbiter. The only


aircraft found that plans to use a fly-by-wire control system in 
its operational phase, without the availability of a mechanical


cable backup flight control system, is the new YF-16 light weight


fighter aircraft. This aircraft has been flown hundreds of


flights without accident due to failure of the all electronic


flight control system.


The terms "eneric design failures'and"generic design flaws 
used in this report are considered to be synonymous with the


terms psychotic operation/behavior and psychotic problems


respectively. These alternste terms have been used in some of 
* the earlier working papers on this same subject. 
- Paragraph 2.0 of this report discusses design features that 
-are subject to generic design flaws and Paragraph >°0 includes 
I 
a summary of philosophy items, pertinent to the Space Shuttle 
Orbiter, that were obtained from azi investigation of existing 
computer systems. Paragraphs 4o0 nd 5.0 include the recommen­
dations and conclusions. The Appendic6s include more -detailed 
information on electrostatic interference afd additional and 
more detailed information on individual computer systems investi­

gated. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
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2.0 Design Features Subject to Generic Design Failures


Before investigating existing computer systems, a brief look


into system design features that are subject to generic design


failures and design practices .that.can alleviate chances of


these failures is in order. Integrated circuit (IC) components,


interfacing parallel redundant strings, and computer programs


can all be subject to generic design failures.


Additional hard-are and softwire redundancy of identical


design will normally not help to reduce the generic design failure


effects.- This is due to the generic nature of these failures
 

which-affect more than one or all of a given type of line,


replaceable units simultaneously.
 

2.1 Integrated Circuits


Digital avionic systems employing efficient but low power


solid state ZC dev{ces are much more susceptible to-extraneous


electromaznetic and electrostatic interference than their


earlier counterpart, the discrete transistor. This demands that


engineering design attention be given to natural and manniale


environmental disturbances to negate the effects of these dis­

turbances on very sensitive 10 devices.
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Figure I and Table I indicate that the semiconductor


detrelopment trend is toward increasingly lower power operating 
levels and greater noise sensitivity as the population of active 

elezents per unit area of substrate becomes larger. Vulnera­

bility to high voltage, low energy transients is also indicated


by the fact that factory personnel working with IC devices


.are often required to wear wristband grounds to avoid


eouipment burn-out from discharge of clothing charges.


2.1.1 Electromagnetic Sources of Interference


Two prime examples of extraneous electromagnetic sources


that can affect sensitive solid state 10 devices


ere ground radar scanning of the Shuttle and lightning strikes.


Both of these interference sources are difficult to control and


recuire consideration of sufficient shielding in the system design.


2.1.1.1 Electrcmagnetic'Energy Transfer Mechanism


A anner in Which radiated energy can get into IC devices is


as follows. Radiated energy impinging on the vehicle penetrates


through the surface via cracks, bolt holes (with bolts installed)


-or other opening2. Once the energy has penetrated the


vehicles' outer skin the avionic cable bundles act as an antenna.


The cables serve as a transducer, which changes radiated energy


to ccnducted energy, which is then conducted to the IC devices.
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TABLE I 
iJEUCTRONIC DEVICE SUSCEPTIBILITY LEVElS 
____ 
_YAVLFtUNCTIor LEVEL BURNOUT SVEL-
Transistor 5 50 millwatts 50 watts 
-. (Imo test data) 
Typical 5 10 to 100 milliwpatts (not determined)
Integrated 
Circuit 
YOSFET 0.3 to 3 nfcrowatts 4 to 40 mifliwatts 
Integrated (estimated) (estimatea) 
Circuit 
ORIGINAL PAGR IS 
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An unblemished skin (no fasteners, no cracks, or oneninge)


typically provides approximately .00 db of isolation to RF


-energy. However, an unblemished skin is virtually not practicable


It has been found that the bolt holes with bolts installed and


tightened firmly, reduces skin shielding from about 100 db to


about 410 db. On such progrms as Gemini and Harpoon 
Missile, it was found through tests-that the external skin pro­
vided little attenuation (typically 10 to 15 db) to radiated 
energy impinging on the vehicle without specifically designing 
for R- protection. These tests were performed in the 5 to 9 GHz 
range.. ........ . . 
Skin shielding could be as low as zero-decibels if dielectric


windows for sensors are employed. On the Harpoon Missile, the


surface was radiation sealed by using special gaskets and


processes to increase the RF attenuation produced by the skin.


Skin attenuation was increased from'10-15 db to 0O-45 db.


Braided type shields on avionic cables can typically provide from


zero to 30 db of shielding to EF energy depending on the shielding


'design. This shielding adds to the attenuation provided by the
 

skin. On the Harpoon Missile it was found that to achieve 20 to


50 Ab of attenuation from braided shielding required a 560 degree


seal, similar to waveguiie connectors,, at the connectors.


Thirty db of skin attenuation plus 50 db of cable attenu­

ation would provide enough isolation-to be effective against most


PAG11 
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radars as indicated in the following paragraphs. Greater


isolation, however, may be required for lightning.


2.1.1.2 Effects of MSBLS and ANT/FPS-16 Radar


The Shuttle relies on ground generated BF signals from the


NSBLS for automatic landing; and it is highly desirable to trac


the Shuttle with surveillance radars at least during ascent


and lending.


Table Ila indicates that the radiated power-from the ground 
lSBLS/Tacticel Instrument Landing System (TILS) station, seen at 
the Orbiter, is in the microwatt range. Fiaure 1 indicstes that 
the most sensitive MOSFET IC's also operate in the microwatt 
range; Therefore, to preclude circuit malfunctions, with a 10 
db margin of safety, due to the MSBLS ground radiated power, would 
require 10 db of RF isolation. Thie 10 db of isolation should 
be easy to achieve as indicated in the above paragraphs. 
Table Ilb indicates that the maximum radiated-poaer from


the AN/FFS-16 radar, seen at the Orbiter, is in the milliwatt


range. This would require attenuation of about 60 db, vehicle


/ 
skin plus cable, to assure satisfactory operation of the most


sensitive IC devices, assuming a 10 db margin of safety. Note,


that this is for the Orbiter at one nautical mile from the radar


and that the attenuation required would decrease by 6 db each


time this range is doubled.


The 4SBLS ground station and the AN/FPS-16 radar were selected
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TABLE II 
RADAR INTERFERENCE SOURCES


a) nB1STILS Interference Sources 
I-BIS/TILS Transmitter Power (2KW pk) 33dbw 
I1SBIS/TILS Transmitter Antenna Gain, Ground 29db 
Free Space Loss (15.3GHz, ]mMj) -
 121db 
Power Received at the Shuttle at INM'range - 59db0- watts 
*orl1.25x21-' wts 

"- b) AN/FPS-16 Radar Intereference


ANl/FPS&16 Transmitter Power (1.0 MW- pk) 60dbw 
ANI/FPS-16 Circuit Losses - 2dh 
AN/FPS-16 Antenna Gain 45db 
Free Space Loss (5.6 GHz, lnmt) - 113db 
S-Power Received at the Shuttle at -TM range - lOdbw 
or lO0,o00 x 1O-6 watts 
Notes:


* Flux density of 0.037 watts/sq. m. at Orbiter 
-- Flux density of 465 watts/sq. m. at Oriter


P GINAL PG l-I 
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as examples to determine if such ground based radiators could


possibly cause Orbiter circuit malfunctions. It appears that


high 	 power radars could cause circuit malfunctions if sensitive


electronic circuits are used and if the Orbiter skin and avionic


cable bundles provide low attenuation to RF energy. A more


detailed analysis of all radiation sources that• may irradiati


the Shuttle, and an analysis of Orbiter skin and cable bundle
 

attenuation to RF energy would be required to determine the im­

pact of ground radar scanning the Shuttle Orbiter.


2.1.1.5 	 Effects of Lightning


Table III indicates that high shieldiiE levels (70-100 db)


are required for I protection against lightning.


Few serious. accidents on commercial aircraft have been attributed


to lightning because they have heavy metallic surfaces, inherent


flight stability, and safety of flight control systems free of


susceptible avionic components. The Orbiter is inherently un­
stable and it has not been demonstrated as yet that the system is 
free of susceptible avionic components. Therefore, the effects 
of lightning strikes on flight control functions-should be 
considered in detail on the Shuttle. 
2.1.2 Electrostatic Sources of Interference


In addition to electromagnetic energy sources there are


electrostatic charge and discharge mechanisms that have resulted,


in a variety of problems' on aerospace vehicles. The Shuttle
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TABLE III 
CO 0ONENT SUSCEPTIBILITY TO LIGHTNING 
DEVICE fJanimum Shielding Required to Protect Against 
Miahtning 
Bipolar 70db 
Integrated


Circuits 
(o0

transistors 
per chip) 
1403 (unipolar) 100db 
- Integrated 
Circuits (5000 to


10,00


transistors


per chip)
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Orbiter is Judged uniquely vulnerable to electrostatic charge 
hazards because of the high electrical resistivity and large 
- surface areas of its RSI which is in proximity to inherently 
susceptible solid state digital avionics equipment. 
Exploratory laboratory tests and analytical predictions 
of RSI electrostatic behavior suggests a 
much more severe impulse noise environment for the Orbiter than


commonly experienced in flight on conventional metallic skinned


airplanes. The electrostatic potential is acquired through


frictional charging by particulate matter in the atmosphere


(printipally ice or rain 2articlba in clouds), by engine- exhaust


charging, or by thunderstorm cross-fields. Conventional aircraft


use sharply pointed "static dischargers" located in.high aero­

dynamic flow regions near the extremities of the aircraft to


bleed off excess charge in a controlled manner, virtually elimi­

nating the electrostatic i~iterference problems. Without the


dischargers, the static charge may build up until the vehicle is,


-charged to a very high potential; on the order-of hundreds of


thbusands of volts. Rowever, with static dischargers and con­

ventional metal structures, the charge rapidly bleeds off hnd


-maintains the vehicle at an acceptable low voltage level. 
Two problems are immediately obvious in the Orbiter design 
with its dielectric (electrically insulated) RSI costing. 
The first is that static charge will build up on the 
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dielectric surface and cannot bleed off because the dielectric


will not conduct the charge to a common discharge point where a


static discharget can be located. With the smooth contours of


the 	 .$8Iand the large surface area, voltages may build up on the


exterior surface in the megavolt range with very significant


energy. The second problem is the-design of static diachargers


which can withstand the dynamic-launch and entry beating environ­

menAts.... -
RF interference due to uncontrolled static. 
charge results in precipitation--static in radios as well as


logic errors in digital circuits. Flights of both the Minuteman


and the Titan have abown. that airborne computers-used for guidance


and commands are extremely susceptible to a single discharge of


very low-energy static electricity. See Appendix I for a mote


thorough description of: avionic responses to a precipitation


-static environment, other threats from ele'atrostatic charges, 
and electrostatic noise spectrum end magnitudes.


2.2 Interfacing Parallel Redundant Electronic Strings


Multiple 'computational strinis often interface at compare­
tors/voters and in equalization circuits. Some typical develop­

ment practices which help to preclude generic failures due


to 	 such interfaces are:
 

a) 	 Comparators that Ere comparing computations from more 
than one channel should have failure modes such that 
-15­

a failure is obvious. A "fail obvious'


comparator is needed.


b) Vhenever information from two channels flows within 
the same box (e.g. information to comparstors), wiring_ 
and connector pin separation should be such that the 
two lines cannot be shorted together. Shorts 
between two channels should not go undetected. 
a) Comparisons should be'made at the end of the control


strings. However comparisons can also be made at


other points.


a) 	 Recognize that failures can be altitude or other 
flight parameter sensitive. For example, a failure 
may be simulated at 100 feet altitude with no 
deleterious effects; but at 300 feet altituie, the 
failure could cause catastrophic effects. This is 
because the failed condition is present for a 
longer period of time before landing. 
Techniques used for equalization of commands in the parallel
 

and redundant computational strings are of prime concern on the


Orbiter. This is because small differences in signals batwe~n


computational strings have a-tendency to propagate and result in


divergent commands because of integration processes in.the system. 

This divergent teniency can be overcome by proper equalization 

end/or synchronization tcchniquee. However, these techniques 
ORIGINAf PAGB 1 
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tend to add coplexity, reduce reliability, and add computa­

tional string interface points that are subject to generic


design failures. Therefore, it is important that the final


solution to the equalization problem be proven free of generic


design flaws.


2.5 Computer Programming


In addition to normal computer program verification,the


following verification techniques should be used to lessen


chances of psychotic operation due to computer programming oversights.


.a)Verify effects of sequences or strings of failures.


On past programs (e.g. TAGS) certain timing of failures


relative to each other have caused shutdown of all


computer systems. All possible reversionary modes and


their effect must be investigated.


b) Pay psrticular attention to those computations that


ate not performed every computational cycle. The


effect of errors in these computations tend to


be overlooked.


o)	Verify times for which computers will hmit for data.


For example: are there instances in which one or


more computers could be running with old deta and one


or more other comutera running with newer data?


This could cause comparators to indicate a non-compare.


d) Recognize that checking out the computer program is


different from checking out the system design-both


are required.


b~iqiqgjPAGIT-'M 
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3.0 Philosophy Items of Existing Computer System


5.1 Aircraft Computer System Philosophy


Both flight and non-flight computer systems were investi­
gated. However, the airborne systems were found to have more 
applicability to the Orbiter comnuter systems than the ground 
based systems. A computer 8ystem design and switching philosophy 
was generated fromthe information received. It is felt that this 
philosophy represents typical computer switching philosophy for 
euisting operational aircreft. Key points of this chilosophy are:


a) Plan for failures by using a deterministic design apDprach 
that assumes failure will hanpen (Yurphy's Law). Do not 
rely on'a reliability number (such as .9998) alone. 
b) Functional redundancy is preferred to barahare 
redundancy only. 
e) Reconfigure by turning devices off, rather than on. 
d) Avoid synthesis of a viable system from severdl


strings. The pilot needs an easily understandsble 
configuration. Ease of understanding is best achieved 
by switching entire strings of electronic equipment. 
e) Confirm failures before disconnecting equipment when


possible to preclude using up configuration options too


fast and to allow crew to function in the decision


process.
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f) Permit severa levels of degraded performance to


preclude using up options too fast..


These system philosophy points are used for current commerial


and military aircraft and therefore are not necessarily applicable


to the Shuttle Orbiter. However, items a) thru d) appear to be


applicable to the Orbiter while e) and f) may not be applicable


due to these greater time criticality of the Orbiter functions


and the higher Orbiter performance requirements. This section of


the report discusses only the key findings fro *the survey of


existing computer systems. For additional information on


*individual computer -systems refer to Appendices II through XVIII.


3.2 Aircraft Computer System Overview


An overview of key parameters of existing systems is given


in Table TV. Included in the overview are parameters that are of


interest in the generic design flaw investigation. -These pera­

meters include failure cues provided to the pilote, criteria used


to deactivate failed computers, methods used for system reconfig­

uration, and the "state" assumed by a failed computer.*


Large commercial and military aircraft'invedtigated (DC-In, 
L-lOll and B-1) use four computational strings. The four computers 
are grouped into two palate form a dual-dual computational 
system. 'This is done to keep one group of two computers physi­

cally and electrically isolated from the other group. That is,


the computer one output is compared with the computer two output
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.TABLE IV - CO14PUTER SWITCHING APPROACHES 

TYE OF
CO1-.f UTER 
SBYSTmF .[ 

DC-10 

2BY 2 

CO4PUTER 

COMPARISON 

PLUS PERFOR-
MANCE AND 
FAILURE 
ASSESSMENT 

MONITOR 

(PAFAM); 
2 BY 2 
COMPARISON 

OF ANALOG 

STRINGS 

PLUS VOTERS 

FOR SIGNAL -
SELECT. 

VOTERS 

SELECT ONE 
SIGNAL TO 

DRIVE

VEHICLE. 

Bi 
2 BY 2 

COMPARISON 
OF ANALOG 

STRINGS. 
-
CRITERIA TOFAILURI N THOD OFCUES TO DEACTIVATE RECONFIGU-" 
PILOT -FAILED 1RATION]-
SCOMINITER 

AMBER LIGHT- NON C0OMPARE 
ONE HALF OF STRINGS-
SYSTEM PAFAM 
 
FAILED. INDICATES 
 
RED LIGHT- FAILURE. 
COMPLETE 
SYSTEM 
-

FAILED. 

BAT XANDLES NON 
DROP IF COMPARE 
FEEDBACK OF CHANNELS 
FROM SERVOS & INVALID 

INVALID. 
 
"NO DUAL" 

OR "DUAL 

AUTOLAND 

NOT AVAIL-

ABLE..


DISPLAY.
 
--

PILOT NOT-

IFIED OF NON 

3O.PARE OF 
tO'PUTATION-

AL STRINGS. 

ORIGINAL" PAGfl IS 
OF POOR QUAIXY 
SERVO 
 
FEEDBACK. 
 
.


IN AUTO-
LAND MODE: 
WITH SINGLE 
FAILURE 
 
PILOT GOES 
 
MANUAL OR 
ABORTS 
 
.
LANDING
 
M NT / T 
JAUTOMATI-
CALLY GOES 
T,0 STRINGS 
-PAFAM PRE-
VENTS AUTO-

LAND


DISCONNECTIN SOE


ASES.


- PAFA14 
IOTIFIES 
CREW OF 
FAILED COND.


AUTOMATIC 
 
DISCONNECTIO


SWITCH OUPUT


OF AFC TO


GROUND POINT


CREPW NORI4ALL 
ONLY


MONITORS. 
AUTOMATIC 
DISCONNECT-
ION0 .PILOT 
CAN RECONN-
ECT STRING 
IF FAILURE


INDICATION


FOLLOTIED BY 
GOOD IN-

DICATION.


FAL
ECOMPUTER 
CONTINUES TO


OPERATE


YES 
YES 
]


YES
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TABLE IV - COMFUTER SWITCHING APPROACHES (COMPLETED) 
Tf FAILURE 
OPUTER CUES 
SYSE . TO PILOT 
..---.. ....... 
-P-hAUTOIAND 
SIMPLEX DEDUCED FROM 
AUTOLAND SECONDARY 
AUTOPILOT SYSTEM 
COUPLER (SPN-41), 
(SPN-42). "MANUAL' OR 
-"WAVEOFF" 
COWANDS. 
MASTER 
 
CAUTION 'AND 
 
COUPLER OFF 
 
LIGHTS. 
 
..... 
 
SIMPLEX COM- PANEL LIGHT 
PUTER WITH ALERTS CREW, 
M0 DATA


USES (NOT 
IN SAFETY OF 
.-LIGHT LOOP). i 
CRITERIA TO 
 
DEACTIVATE 
FAILED 
 
COUTER


NO CI4D' S 
RECEIVED


FOR 1 ? -
TIME 
HARD6VER 
CONTROL 
SURFACES 
 
.AIRCRAFT 
OUTSIDE


SAFE


BOUNDARIES 
SET BY 
GROUND.


PILOT MAKES 
DECISION.


" 
 
Fz; FLY By 
-RE. NO 
(PANEL LIGHTS FAILURES 
INDICATE DETECTED BY 
AUTOMATIC FAILED COlrPARATORS 
FLIGHT . ELECTRONICS DEACTIVATE 
MODES OR AND FAILED ELECTRONICS 
COMPUTERS ACTUATORS AND/OR 
IN EACH AXIS ACTUATORS 
AND EACH 
STRING.


S T i-vl PILOTS 
INSTRUMENT RECEIVE 
UNIT (IU) ATTITUDE 
SINGLE OF BOOSTER. 
 
'COIMPUTER 
 
WITH 
DUPLEX 
Mff24ORY& 
TMR 
CIRCUITRY


ONLY INPUTS 
TO THE TVR' 
LOGIC THAT 
DO NOT " 
COMPARE ARE 
NOT USED. 
METHODS OF 
 
RECONFIGU-

RATION-

UA/A 
 
AUTOMATIC 
-
MANUAL 
-
._-

AUTOMATIC 
" 
 
.


" 
 
IAN NOT -
INVOLVED. 
-FAILED 
COMPUTER. TO THE TMRl 
TRtS TO' LOGIC ARE


REINITIALIZE. NOT USED.


t AILED


COM.fPUTER 
CONTINUES TO
OPERATE 
YES


YES


YES FAILED,


ELECTRONICS


OUTPUT


- HUNTED 
TOPGROUNDo 
-
-
E 1s,hOWEVER 
INPUTS 
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and the computer three output is compared with the computer four


output. There are no.or few connections between groups of


strings, Computers one and two form a group, and computers


three and four form another group.


The DO-lO equalizes, or makes equal, the sensor signals


feeding each group of computers. This is accomplished in a


manner necessary to cancel long term variations-but detect short


'term variations between the-channels in a group. These short­

term varistions are more indicative of failures. Similarly the


computational difference between the- two channels under comparison


....
are subtracted out (cancelled) so that the comparators will only 
.eense true failures. 
-The PkFAM used on the DO-10 was not used in the other aircraft 
systems. The-PAFAM provides supervisory control of sutoleni disconnect 
functions and includes a fast time model for predicting the air­
craft touchdown point. The PAFIX has been found useful but not 
mandatory for autoland. 
On the DC-10 program, it has been indicated tht two types


of system degradations must be designed for: equipment mal­

'-functions and input source errors.'- Input source errors include


wind sheers and erroneous landing system information. The PAFAM
 

was used to detect these input source errors and to provide prer


dicted ground landing system data during short drop outs or losses


of ground landing system information.
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All of the large operational military and commercial aircraft


use a fly-by-cable backup system for flight control. The F-PC


test aircraft was the first (1972) afrcraft to fly with a fly-by­

wire system with no mechanica! backiup system Tfor failure


reversion. This was on a test system only. The new YF-16 is


believed to be the first fighter with no mechanical cable backup


System in its planned operational configuration. In all cases it


was found that a failed computer was allowed to continue to


6rrate after it was switched off line. 1n the event the failure


"is rectified the computer could then be used again.


Numerou& methods of reconfiguring computer systems were 
noted. The switching of a computer off line was' accomplished 
automatically, manually and sometimes a combination of automatic 
and manual techniques were used. Some of the methods of recon­

figurations found are defined in Table IV.


The-fighter aircraft computer systems were generally not


applicable to the Orbiter because often aimplex dedicated


computational strings are used for each group of functions. In


the F-15 the simplex computation string, performing non safety


of flight computations, can however be pressed into service to


perform navigation computations if required as a backup measure.
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5.5' 	 Spacecraft Computer System Overview 
The Saturn V Instrumentation Unit did not include any means


for the crew to manually reconfigure the Instrumentation Unit


computer system due to lack of redundancy and time criticality


of the booster functions.


A primary example of how functional redundancy has been


used 	 on spacecraft programs 3s the use of the Lunar Module (114) 
guidance system to safely bring the combined Command Service


Module (0SM) and LM back to Earth after a failure in the ADollo 15 0SM. 
5.4 	 Ground Computer System Overview,


Review of the ground computer systems indicated that these


systems were not applicable to the Shuttle application. Thie 1 
because most of these systems used dedicated strings and manual 
break-before-make switching. It has been found that the typical
 

failure is a ccmnuter malfunction that manifests itself iA large


errors such that the operator can detect the errors and effect a


manual switch over to a bsckup computer. The break-before-make


switchover does not allow for generic failures per the definition


used 	 in this report. The ground computer systems reviewed


included the NASA JSC mission control center (RTCC and COATS)


computers, the NASA GSC remote site automated aystems, and the
 

* KSC Saturn Launch Vehicle (PAD59) automated systems. See


Appendices II through XVIII for further definition of the


computer systems investigated.
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4.0 Recommendations


It'is recommended that no further studies of the existing


aircraft, spacecraft, and ground systems be undertaken unless


they are pf a very specific nature to investigate individual


items for which information is required. It is felt that the


review of existing systems has provided some general computer
 

system design philosophies and general guidelines which are


applicable to the Shuttle Orbiter and which bave been enumerated


in'this report. However, it has also been found that most systems


implementations reviewed can only provide a limited amount of


applicable information due to their dissimilarity to be Shuttle


Orbiter.


It is also recommended that'the emphasis now be directed


towards the Shuttle to relate the applicable aircraft philosophies,.


to study apnlicable equalization approaches and to investigate


individual potential generic failure problems of the Orbiter.
 

It is further recommended that design groups be made aware


of their responsibility to stamp out generic feilure mechanisms


.by checking their designs for possible generic failure modes


and by eliminating any failure mechanisms found. However, it must


be recognized that this effort can only be directed from a system


design team having cognizance of the Shuttle systems as well as


the generic failure mechanisms.
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It is also recommended that efforts to assess the sus­

ceptibility of the Orbiter to electromagnetic and electrostatic


energy be continued and increased in order to solve the apparent 
generic design failure nodes due to these energy sources. None 
of the existing aircraft electrostatic dischargers, either


active or passive ore likely to meet the Orbiter requirements as 
they are designed. Therefore, new or modified designs are 
recommended.
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5o0 Conclusions


It is felt that this investigation ba been of value and 

that it will provide background material necessary to identify, 

define and solve unique Orbiter generic design problems. 

In many areas much additional work remains. For example: 
o The potential for Shuttle Orbiter generic design 
failures due to electromagnetic or electrostatic 
- energy was proven. However, the unicue transfer 
functions for the Poupling-of this energy into the


Orbiter circuit components and the susceptibility


of these components were not determined..­

o The-aesign features and philosophy of some existing


computer systems have been determined. Now these


philosophies need to'be directed toward the Shuttle,


so that they can be used where appropriate.


o The susceptibility of interfacing parallel redundant 
strings of electronics and. computer programs to 
generic failures have been identified. Detailed 
effort is now required to analyze. all interfaces of


parallel redundant strings including interfhces for


signal equalization, voting, and comparisons. Effects


of synchronization, voting, isolation, disconnect method,


signal bias, time delays, asynchronous operation, and 
inadvertent errors/failures must be evaluated.


o Proararmning rules end tests to minimize or eliminste


pro~reming overeihts need to be define and imolemented.
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APPENDIOIM


Appendicies I through XVIII follow. Appendix Z includes more


detailed information on electrostatic interference and


Appendicies II through XVIII include additional and more


detailed information on individual computer systems investigated.
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APPENDIX I
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ELECTROSTATIO INT?$EFS"CE 
1.0 Avionic Responses to Precipitation Static Environments


1.1 RF Interference


Radio frequency interference due to static charge has been
 

encountered since the first flights of early aircraft in bad


weather. Precipitation static (P-static) is well understood today


.and has become the subject of specifications that control both the


charging of the source and the susceptibility of radio equipment.
 

-Nevertheless, P-static control remains an active discipline as


the evolution toward more complex, more sensitive avionics


systems continue to uncover new modes of interference. Phase­

lock systems, FM systems, radio-guidance systems, and navigation


aids are all affected by static electrification discharges


through different interference modes. Much recent attention has


been directed toward quantifying the acceptable interference


level in terms more appropriate for systems than the simple


signal power/noise parameter. Expressions for the bit rate


error and the probability of a loss of phase lock, and technioues


to reject unreasonable data have been developed.


1.2 Logic Errors


Logic errors caused by a single dischkrge of static


electricity have been encountered when using computers for


guidance, navization, and sequencinz and in logic based programs


for telemetry and data acquisition systems. This type of


PorIGINAII PAGE i­
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interference is quite a different matter than RF interference


discussed previously. Airborne computers, widely used for guidance


and commanis, are extremely susceptible to a singld discharge of


very low-energy static electricity.


During early Minuteman test flights, single electrostatic


discharges caused bit errors in the guidance computer, resulting


in the loss of two missiles due:to premature flight termination.


Single discharges of static also occurred on two separate


Titan III flights in the late 1960s. In the first flight, a.


computer instruction was altered and the computer jumped into a


backup flight.mode. There were ten other modes it could have


.entered, any of which would have terminated.the flight. On the
 

next flight, steering data were altered and the missile turned


off path; the guidance error introduced by the electrical dis­

charge was eventually corrected. During an extensive grovnd test


program that ensued, it was discovered that a spark energy'as low


as 565 ergs (0.0000565 joule) was sufficient to upset the domputer.-

For comparison, an operating room is considered ether-safe at


O,o00 ergs, and safe for the most sensitive anesthetics at


4,000 erga.


Other.computers of quite.different and more advanced design


were tested during a subsequent program. Despite the fact that


these designs included isolators and filters on input-output


lines, it was still found that some circuits were susceptible to
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as little as a few thousand ergs in a single spark. In one case,


there was a period of 187 microseconds during certain logic


operations in which the susceptibility was an order-of-magnitude


more 	 severe than at other times.


A similar situation has been encountered with data multi­
plexing systems. In one particular case, one of the wlres .as 
found susceptible to a few hundred ergs in discharge, and to an 
energy as low as 1 millivolt at a 100 kc rate. This wire was the 
midpoint connection between a balanced bipolar power supply and


the differential (operational) amplifiers used to amplify all


samples of date.


Finally, a very simple operational amplifier, used in an


ordinance circuit monitor to ensure that there are no stray


signals, has been found to be susceptible to a single static


electricity discharge of 1 x 105 ergs applied in the positive


sense, but susceptible to as little-energy as 500 ergs applied


identically, except in the negative sense.


2.0 	 Effects of a Static Environment on Non-Avionics


In'addition to the interference with electronics the


electrification of the Orbiter may pose a significant threat to


the integrity of the RSI itself as well as a safety hazard to


both ground and orbital operations. On conventional large air­

craft, dielectric surfaces no larger than a windshield or canopy


have proven very troublesome because of charge buildup. The
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charge o-ten'builds u -until large sparks are'generated to the


surrounding metallic structure; or when metallic heaters are,


laminated into the windshield, sparks have punctured the outer


laminates and attached to the heater circuit, often damaging both


the windshield and heater circuit in the process. Charge can be


stored long enough for serious electrical shocks to be experienced


when ground personnel contect the windshield after lending.


Obviously, these problems will .be magnified greatly when essenti­

ally the entire exterior surface of the vehicle in non-conducting.


It is interesting to note that studies on the electrification


of Titan and Apollo rockets have shown that the vehicle may be


charged to several hundred kilovolts by engine'exhaust charging


once the exhaust plume breaks contact ith the ground. Very


little precipitation charging of these metal-skinned rockets was


experienced at higher altitudes because the conductive exhaust


bled the charge off the vehicle as fast as it accruedt This is


unlike aircraft where the exhaust is not as conductive. It should


also be noted that the noqlsrity of static electrification is not


usually predictable. It is, therefore, entirely possible that


engine exhaust charging could raise the potential of the metal


Orbiter substructure to a high value of one polarity, while an


opposite precipitation charge develops on the RSI surfaces. The


charges could not cancel, as they have been seen to do on conven­

tionel rockets, resulting in an additional potential difference
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between the exterior surface and the metal substructure.


Under these conditions the voltage differential can quickly


become great enough to flash across the tile surface and dis­

charge to the vehicle substructure via the gap joints. With the


massive amount of dielectric RSI surface, charge accumulation may


be rapid enough (with no bleed-off path) to result in a nearly


continuous arc: stresming-across'and through the tiles.


Multiple pits and cracks in the RSI and its surface coatings are


likely consequences of such an energetic sparking activity.
 

5.0 	 Electrostatic Noise Soectrum and Mscnitudea


Both flight test and laboratory measurements of the precipi­

tation static energp distributions have been made by a number of 
-researchers in this field. Figure,2 shows the generated noise 
strength from laboratory simulated trioelectric charging of


various dielectric materials in the one to fcur 0Hz freouency
 

spectrum. The levels are high enough to suggest ccnsideration


be given to obtaining similar data for the Shuttle Thermal


Protection System (TPS) materials, in view of a possible degrading 
influence upon TACAN, Radar Altimeter, and YSBLS performance 
during the landing phase. Figure 5 shows the noise current 
spectral density at lower frequencies as a function of altitude. 
Here it is significant to note a five fold buildup in noise at


1 2Mi{z (Shuttle Dsta Bus Frequency) from sea level to 50,000 feet.
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5.1 	 Preliminary Shuttle TPS Electrification Prognosis


During early experiments at the 200 Lightning Simulation


Lab on the electrification characteristics of L11500 hSI tiles, wind


blown dust pazticles created a charging rate many times higher


than that exhibited by conventional aircraft materials. This may


have been due to the rough surface textuje of the tiles. Prelimi­

nary data indicated-the Shuttle will charge at eight times the


rate of an exposed all metallic skinned airplane.


Separate measurements were made of surface end volume 
resistivity of the sample L11500 tiles on hand. These data 
indicated much higher values than nad been expected; in fact so 
high as to be unmeasureable (5.1012 ohms) by a 500 volt megohm­
meter. This result combined with the high charge rates observed, 
suggests a potentially severe P-static problem to both the TPS 
and avionics systems even under nominal entry conditions. 
To get a grasp of the maghitude of static discharge energy


which could result from an Orbiter covered with LI1500 (or L19O0)


flying thr6ugh typical ice crystal cloud formations, the


following elementary analysis is offered:


Consider one tile of PSI, 6 inches square (surface area of


I face - .0250m2. Since most P-static charging will be-in


Orbiter frontal areas where heat and therefore tile thickness is


greater, asume a tile thickness of 5.5 inches or .09m including 
the felt Strain Isclation Pad (SIP). From high voltage punch 
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."through tests conducted on L115O0 PSI; assume 10Ukv/inch


required to punch through the thickness of the-tile (about the


same as for air). Flashover around the surface is another


possibility and may likely occur st much lower voltages. The


flashover voltage is very difficult to predict but it will be a


function of tile coating, humidity, pressure and contamination.


For calculation purposes, assume 100 kv as the lower limiting


voltage for flashover.vs 350 kv as the upper limit via punch


through. The charge stored on the surface of the tiles will be


calculated for both cases.


First, the capacitance of the tile is 0 E A. Assume


d


E-= e 8.85 x 0-12 joules/nevton-m2 . ­

a = 8.85 x 10-12 x 0.02 2.26 x l1 2 farads


. .09 ­

since Q = OV,


the charge for flashover, Qf (2.26 x 102-1)(10)5)


2.26 x 1o-7 coulombs.


the charge for punch through, QP (2.26 x 10-12)C5. 
 
105) 7-9 x I0-7 coulombs.


The energy of one spark discharge from a capacitance of 2.26 x


*10-12 farads can also be calculated:


-2
E 1 2 = (2.26 x 10- 12 )(10 5)2 = 1.15 x 10 oules 
2 
2 
 
Ef = 115,000 ergs


similarly B = l. 8 x l0 ergs


p


--39­
x 
These calculations- iiicate spark energies of hundreds of


thousande-of ergs are possible. From Paragraph 1.2 it has been


shown that a spark energy as low as 565 ergs is sufficient to


upset a ccmouter logic in an actual spacecraft installation.


Assuming a charging rate of 4 0/amps/square foot as measured on


conventional aircraft in flight, one tile would see a charge rate
 

of 10Pamps (10-5 coulombs/second)resulting in 44.2 flashover


discharges of 115,000 ergs per second per tile, or i2.7 punch


through discharges of 1.5 x i06 ergs per second per tile.


Although the number of tiles representing the electrical equiva­

lent of the Orbiter frontal area has not been calculated, it is


reasonable and conservative to estimate 100 tiles (250 sq. feet).


Thus:


o Total flashovers = h,200/second at 115,000 ergs. 
o Total punch-throughs = 12,70O/seconi at 1.5 x 106 ergs. 
o Equipment susceptibilities observed: one spark st .565 ergs.


OP po 2 
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-DO-lQ CG1PUTER SYSTEM 
The DC-10 uses four analog computer systems for flight 
control. The computer architecture is depicted in Figures 4 
through 6. This system is, however, backed up bi a mechanical 
cable flight control system. The four computers are grouped into 
two pairs to form a dual-dual computational system. That is, 
computer IA outputs, of Figures A or 5, are compared. with computer 1B 
outputs and computer 2A outputs are compared with computer 2B 
outputs. There are no cross comparison, between computers IA/lB 
and 2A/2B. Comparisons are made four times in the computational 
path on actual cocmanis. Sensor signal differences, for example,


to computers IA and lB are subtracted out (equalized or cancelled)


since the detection of short period variations between channels


is of interest. These short period variations, rather than long


term variations, between the computational channels are indicative


of channel failure. Similarly, the computational difference


between the two channels under comparison are subtracted out


(cancelled out) so that the comparators will only sense true


failures.


When a non compare is indicated between two compu­

tational channels both channels are switched out of the


system because it cannot be determined which channel


has failed. However, in scme DQ-lO's a PAFAM unit is used


in addition to the fcur computational strings. In this*


-42­

DUAL 
YAW RATE


GYROS uO. 1 COPUTER NO. I


A A SERVO 
' IA

~LOWER 
RUDDER
COMPARATOR" COMPARATOR 
ACTUATOR 
SERVO


1a


DUAL


" YAI RATE 
GYROt No.-2 COMPUTER NO. 2 
AA > SERVO 
2A UPPER


-- RUDDER


COMPARATOR 
- COMPARATOR ACTUATOR


FIGURE 4 - TYPICAL DC-10-FOUR. CHANINEL SYSTEM 
DRIGINAL PAGE ­
'OR POOR QUALTnY 
-43­
CRUISE LEFT INBOARD 
CRUSENOMUTAIO 
LANDING 
LAND COMPUTATION 
A ' ,CHANNEL IA -RIGHT OUTBOARD 
_.-­
--- COMPARATORS 
113 LAND COMIPUTATION - 'B 
CHANNEL 1B 
CRUISE RIGHT INBOARD" 
SENSOR __ACTUATOR


2 CRUISE COMPUTATION 
LANDING - :.. . .. 
SENS " LAND COMPUTATION 
-
CHANNEL 2A - - OUTBOARD-LEFT 
-CUAO
* COMPARATORS 
"'28 LAND-COMPUTATION 28 
CHANNEL 2B 
FIGURE 5 - 1C-10 SIMPLIFIED AUTOMATIC PILOT BLOCK DIAGRAM 
ORIGINAfl PAGE 5. 
-44­

f, AUTO%'& EQUAI ZATION 
DIREIEIOACTORUATO 
* 
tlMtOflLEISP'EEO 
L- DUAL 
IGUllRE6S­ D-b AUTO'ATIC 
, , ' 11ECTOR | mOatAc ~uEnR FJ-ITCH 
-COAUTEJ 
"PoolqAT ICTL o,,,,, o on IRS45-
FIGURE6 - DC-10 AUO) TIC 
INDI-CATOR 
- CNR 
[. 
> ACTUT OR 
LIHTCOTRL 
S M 
SURFACEf 
- AC" 
YSE 
z 
D~I CTATR URAC 
-4C 
case&the PAFAM cen be used to determine which of the two strings


has failed so that the good string can-remain active. 
-
The PAFAM 
... ...... .. --.. .. . .. . . 
unit will prevent autoland systems disconnection if it observes 
-no hardover fslures and if it observes no perforance degradation. 
'This is true even if the comparators for the computational strings 
-indicate a "non compare" or failed condition. -­
- -" The PAFAM unit provides-dissimilar functional redfndari-y to 
"-the flight •control syste&.'" The unit is digital and is 100 percent 
,selfomonitorel, "nd" includes a watch dog timer, sample ch ck -and 
Wchek "LVroncr register transfer. -The unit-is designed to meet 
FAA criteria-of less than or equal to one false indication in 
109 -inicat\ ens. 
The PAFAM proviies supervisory control of eutoland disconnect 
functions, as noted previously. It includes a fast time model for 
prediction of the aircraft touchdown point. This predicted


touchdown point is displayed to the-crew. "Takeover" and other


advisory commands ere displayed to crew Vnen a failure is detected


by the PAFAM. The PAFAM notifies the crew of a failed condition


and allows comnuter switching but doesn't accomplish switbhing


by itself. The PAPAM also acts as a third entry for verification


of failed computation strinqs. When two strings fail due to a


non compare the PAFAM restores one computationsl sting­

to use-the good one.
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The DO-10 program has indicated that two types of system


degradations must be designed for: equipment malfunctions and


input source errors. Input source errors include wind sheers and


erroneous landing system beams. With input signal source errors


the comparators for the redundant computational path will indicate


a compare condition but the vehicle may not be going to land on


the runway. The PAFAM unit uses the fast time model to detect


input source errors and to predict the touchdown point.


The PAF' receives all inputs received by the other


computational strings plus it uses other sensors such aA


accelerometers to sccomplieh its supervisory functions.


The PAFAM has been found useful but not mandatcry for auto­

land. During development the PAFAM confirmed non-optimum control


laws and assisted by indicating when manual takeover was required. 
The PAFAM-ws included-in the initial system planning, because 
it was felt that something could be overlooked in automatic 
system design and at the time pilots had a low confidence level


in autoland systems.


The DO-lO has an analog flight control system because at


the time of development all industry experience was anal6g and


there was a high confidence in the ability to control and 
suppress electromagnetic impulses in analog flight control 
systems. On the DC-10 program a trade was made between triplex


and quad computational strings. Quad was selected -due to its
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lower sensitivity to failures and because the quad aporoach


matched plans for four control surfaces, and sensors in pairs.
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-1011 COMI:UTER SYSTEM


The L-l01l uses four anslog computer systems for flight


control. The computer architecture is depicted in Figure 7.


This system is, however, backed up by a mechanical cable flight


control system. The four computers are grouped into two pairs


to form a dual-dual computational system. Comparisons are made


between the strings of each dual set in both the ILS and automatic


flight control system. The voters select the best computer


outputs. For example, one of two center signals are selected
 

or the center signal is selected after one failure-. For the


command rate and command position servos the servo feedback to


the servo amplifier must equal the servo amplifier command


-within-a given tolerance. A false condition indicates a failure.


On this system two failures of a similar nature cause complete


and automatic disconnection of the autopilot. The pitch and


roll channels are not dual-dual in the autoland mode. The yaw


channel is always dual-dual.
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B-i COMPUTER SYSTEM


The B-I uses four analog computational systems for flight


control. The computer architecture is depicted in Figure 8. This 
system is, however, backed up by a mechanical cable flight


control system. The four computers are grouped into two pairs


to form a dual-dual computational system. Comparison6 are made


between the strings of each dual Bet in both the flight contr6l


el&ctronics outputs and the actuators. Equalization of signals


between two channels is accomplished at the actuators. "


The requirement for operation is fail operational, fail


* safe. The failure reversion modes used are four computationai 
strings active to two strings active to mechanical cable control. 
The mechaijical system can fly the vehicle safely. The reason 
for functional redundancy-fly-by-wire and fly-by-cable is that 
*this was a proven and safe design. The disconnection of the . 
fly-by-wire system is both at the flight control output and, the 
actuators shown in Figure 8. Disconnectibn is accomplished at


the actuators if the system cannot compensate for differences in


*channels, within safe limits.
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DO-10 DIGITAL P&D CC STUTER SYSTEM


This digital flight control system is a "dualqusd" system


used for both flight control and autoland. The system consibts


of two digital computers driving four analog systems. The


digital computers have digital to analog output channels and


analog to digital conversion on the input channels. Each


digital computer drives two analog strings. The analog strings


have an output comparison logic which removes two strinzs at a


time if-a "no-compare" situation occurs. One digital computer


and two analog strings work together as a dedicated system


which-is not cross strapped with the other digital computer


and its two analog strings.


A single system consisting.of one digital computer and two


analog strings was installed in parallel with one-half of the


normal DO-lO analog system and flown successfully several times.


No DO-10 PAFAM system was used during these flights.
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F-4 COMUTER SYSTEM
-..
 
The F-4 autoland system uses a simplex eutoland autopilot


coupler system. Autolsnd commands for the system are generated 
by the SP-N-h2 radar tracking landins system which is located on 
aircraft carriers or on the ground. Comands from the SPN-42 are 
transmitted to the F-4 via ab ASW-25 data link system. In 
addition to this autocoupler system a secondary landing system 
is located on the F-. This secondary, SPN-41 (or 0-SCAN), 
landing system is a microwave lending system that provides 
azimuth and elevation error information to the pilot 
similar-to the conventions-l ILS." The S±N-41 is 
used by the pilots to ascertain that the SPN-42 sutocoupler 
autoland system is functioning properly. The SP'-41 system is 
not an autoland system however, it provides a measure of


functional redundancy since the SPN-41 may-be used (weather per­

mitting) to accomplish a manual landing if the SPN42'autocoupler


system fails. The primary function of the SPN-41 is to provide


confidence to the pilots that the autoland system (SPN-42 coupler)


is performing an accurate automatic landing.


Failure cues for the pilots are obtained in several ways.


Failure are deduced from the secondary SPN-41 system displays,


from manual or waveoff commands generated at the shipborne or


ground terminal and transmitted to the F-4 via the data link;
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and from the master caution and. coupler off light.


The criteria for deactivating the autoland coupler mode are;


no commands received on board via the data link for "" seconds,


hardover control surfaces, and aircraft outside safe bounisries­

set by the ground. If any of these conditions are true the


autocoupler system will automatically disconnect, requiring


manual takeover. TFhen the coupler and autopilot sre disengaged 
from the autoland mode the systems are placed in the stability 
augmentation mode. 
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F-80 COMFUTER SYSTFYb"


The F-80 fly-by-wire control system includes a digital


primary system and an analog backup system. These systems" were


substituted for the-normal F-8 mechanical flight control system.


The Apollo computer was used as the heart of the primary system.


As shown in'Figure 9 a simplex digital primary systems and a


"riplex electrical analog backup system were used. -As shown


there was an active and a monitor servo path. If-a failure 
occurred in either path a hydraulic comparator would sense the


differential pressure between the active and the monitor servo


valve and transfer control to the backup control system. As long


as the primary control system was generating commands normally,


the backup control system would track the active channel by way


of the synchronization network. Only the hydraulic pressure


was bypassed at the secondary actuator, so"that the backup 
system was ready to take over at any tie. If a transfer to the 
backup system was requested, the bypass was removed and the


synchronization network -as disabled, resulting in immediate


.proportional control from the pilot's stick. Inthe backup mode,


the active servo valve was blocked and the secondary actuator


operated as a force summer for the three backup channels. The


digital computer continued to operate, computing the control laws


which gave the best estimate of what the backup system comanded.


If a transfer to the primary control system was attempted, the
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transient was small as long as the computer was tracking the


backup system. If the error was excessive between the primary


control system and the backup control system, a cross-channel


comparator prevented transfer to the primary control system. 1


Since the trim inputs, sensor position inputs, and electronic


gains were not necessarily the same in each backup control


system channel, equalization was included to reduce errors


between channels. Electronic and servo signals were monitored at


two points within the backup control system. The channel voter


output was compared with the channel voter inputs. If the


difference was greater than the set threshold, the monitor was


latched and-the electronic chennel was reported failed.2


Although built-in fault detection was extre=zly important 
for both the primary and the backup systems, it was of particular 
importance in the primary system. Because the primary system 
was full authority as well as single channel, its responses 
could have beeen hazardous if failures were not handled properly. 

Therefore, it had to be established that no dizital computer 

system hardware failure would cause a hariover or btherwise 

"hazardous signal. Figure 10 shows the type 6f digital system


failure detection used. The Apollo computer had extensive 6nd


proven fault detection and reporting system which was built


into the coiiputer (item 1 in figure 10). This system, modified


slightly for applicstion'to the F-SO airplane, was the most
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significant porti~nof the failure detection system. Some of 
the:types of failures'detected were:1 
Logic circuits -
Parity failed 
Program entered loop and did not exit 
Program attempted to access unused read-only memory 
Program failed to check in occasionally 
Analog circuits -

Voltage went out of limits


Oscillator failed


Timing pulse generator failed


Each of these failures caused a restart, that is, a hardware­

forced transfer out of control law.program to a software routin6


which performed several clearing and initialization steps in


attempt to correct the cause of the restart before allowing


control law comnutations to continue. For some restart conditions,


a signal was issued which caused a transfer to the backup


control system.


The Apollo computer also monitored the performance of the


.inertial measurement unit (item 2, Figure 10). Written intc the


software wero decisions either to transfer the system to the
 

backup control system for serious failures or to select the


direct mode-in the primary system for situations such as an


inertial measurement unit accelerometer failure, which would
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affect only certain augumented modes.


Analysis of primary system failures showed the need for


additional hardware failure detection circuitry (item 3, Figure


10). The failure of certain channel outbita not monitored by


the Apollo computer, in combination with normal rilet reactions


could have led to hazardous situations. These conditions first 
became apparent in piloted, closed-loop simulations using the 
- iron bird simulator. The necessary hardware modifications were 
made and implemented in the system to circumvent these failure 
conditions or to cause a transfer to the backup control system 
when prevention was not possible. 
-. Built-in test equipment for the backup.system and primary 
electronics was nrovided. This self-test equipment could be 
activated only during preflight tests. 
Another type of logic function was the software 
reasonability test which was applied to each surface command 
before it was sent to the digital-to-analog converter. If the 
new command differed from the previous command by more than a 
,predetermined amount, the affected axis would have transferred 
to the direct mode. This down mode philosophy was based on the 
assumption that a ieasonability limit would be exceeded because
 

of generic failures in the augmentation control laws rat'her thn


because of a hardware failure which would have affected the


direct mode as well. It was assumed that a hardware failure
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i 
would *hse been detested by the built-in Apollo computer fault


detection logic.


Preflight testing was accomplished by an automatic self-test


procedure that provided a pseudo end-to-end testing of the system.


The self-test involved the introduction of a logic controlled


stimulus and the disabling of circuit functions; and it used


in-fliht monitors to indicate the response. The use of the in­

flight monitors as the self-test feedback elements served to


check the channel signal paths and the operation of the in-flight


monitors. This resulted in a "bang-bang" type of test with no


indication of system degradation.


The F-C fly-by-wire system experience-with two dissimilar 
systems provides information applieable- to future systems which 
-are likely to have dissimilar redundancy. Moat of the problems 
were concerned with the syncronization of the two systems. The 
goal for transfers from one sybtem to another was to minimize 
transients caused by the transfer. In each instance, the system


in control was tracked by the other system so that transients


:would be minimized. However, the primary system tracked the


'backup-system by estimating the surface command of the backup


system based on the pilot's control commands and trim inputs


only. In transfers from the primary system to the backup system,


the backup system tracked the output of the primary system.


Although this eliminated-the need to reconstruct the primary 
OF POOR­
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system signal propagation in the backup system, it did open the


possibility for unusul initialization conditions when the


transfer occurred during an abrupt maneuver. Another factor


was that a.tranafer from the primary system to the backup system


could have been initiated automatically as a result of a failure,


thus the failure analysis had to consider all possible failures


that could have resulted in a transfer. The timing of this


transfer was critical in some instances when it could have


coupled with the pilot's normal response tb cause unacceptable'


conditions.


Many of the non compare conditions occurring in the


secondary actuator differential pressure networks were caused by


tracking errors bet-een differential pressure signals, which


caused the comparators to trip. The problems were caused by


component tolerances and valve nulls and were prelictabledfor


certain cntrol 6tick locations.


No digital system failures were experienced during flight;


however, some flights were made using the backup mcdd in order


,to evaluate the backup. It is planned to continue the F-80


fly-by-wire program (phase 11) using a fully redundant triplex


system to verify concepts of concerns to the Space Shuttle Orbiter.


Verification of redundancy management software for digital


processing and sensor fault detection, and reduced generic


failure probabilities ehould'result due to thin simulation.
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Thb first F-8O
A dissimilar beckup system will also be used. 
 
fly-by-wire flights were made in 1972 with additional flights


in Phase II planned for 1975 through 1977.
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F-15 O2UTER SYSTEM


The F-15 uses a simplex computer with two data buses for


those functions not in the safety of flight loop. In addition a


separate digital differential analyzer (DDA) is used with an


inertial platform for navigation. In case of a failure of the


DDA the simplex computer serves as a backup to the DDA. In this 
system the pilot makes the decision to deactivate a failed


computer. A panel light alerts the crew of a failed condition.


Deactivation of the failed ccmputer refers t'o disconnection of


the failed unit since the failed unit continues to operate.
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5


- F-4 FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTAP 
The F-4 fly-by-wire system as previously tested has no 
automated flight modes and therefore was not investizated 

extensively for this report. However, this system uses quad 

redundant e1ectronics channels from the control stick to the 

control surfaces and uses elaborate failure detection and 

reporting bircuitry. The panel display lights indicate both the 

failed electronics and failed actuators in each axis and each 

electronic string. These lights are driven from the comparator ­

outputs. Failed electronics and failed actuators can be inde­

pendently deactivated. Deactivation is accomnlished automatically 

upon indication-of a non compare condition. The comparator


scheme used is similar to that described in Appeniix XV,


Advanced Computer System.
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F-14 COMPUTER SYSTEM


The F-1' uses three special purpose digital computers which


operate in a sequential manner. Each computer is dedicated to


selected mission phases which overlap during the switching


period. One computer is used for the take-off, climb, descent,


and landing. Another, the Central Air Data Computer (CADO),


is used for general flight. Thd third, Central Data Processor


(GDP), is used for prime mission objectives such as target 
tracking and fire control. - -
A manual fly-by-cable backup mode is provided. This mode


is achieved by ianually overriding the electronic system.


Mission phase switching is normally done autcmatically. The


computers -are not redundant and do not serve as a backup to


each other.


-75­

APPENDIX XI


-76­

.F Ill COMPUTER SYSTEM


The F-ill uses triple redundant electronics with middle

*value selection. A mechanical cable control system is available 
as a backup system. 
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S-5A OOCGUTER SYSTEM


The cross strapping arrangement used in the Univac 1892 
OComputer System is shown in Figure 11. This diagram indicates 
the extensive cross strapping between modules to prevent a 
single failure in a string from making a serial interface 
section inoperative. Also shown is the corfiguretion for triple 
memory redundancy in which eaoh'processor has independent 
acbesa to all memory banks.
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TAGS COMFUTER SYSTENP 
The Tactical Aircraft Guidance System (TAGS) was designed 
to evaluate advanced flight control concepts. for the CH-47 
helicopter. The system consisted of a triple redundant flight


control system. A simplified block diagram for TAGS is shown _ 
in Figure 12. As shown the triplex sensors are dedicated on a 
channel basis for data accuisition. The flight control actuator


command selection circuits use middle value selection algorithms. 
The actuators are triplex and force-sharing through use of . mechanical 
force-summing bar. A more detailed system block diagram is


shown in Figure 13.


TAGS did experience a psychotic type failure due to program­

ming oversights. The program as initially designed could not


handle a second failure in a second computer before three
 

computation cycles had elapsed since the first failure. This


r6sulted in a complete shutdown of all three computer systems


due to a single failure. Reversion to a mechanical backup 
-system As required to preclude loss of control. 
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FIGURE 22 - TAGS FIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM 
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YF-16 C ,FUTER SYST EM 
The YF-16 uses a quadruple redundant all fly-by-wire


control system. The system has four independent computational­

paths and uses a middle signal select algorithm; except after


two failures a lower signal select algorithm is used. No


fly-by-cable system is retained in the YF-16. After the middle
 

value is selected, the selected'signal is quadrupled so that


foir identical signals are available as outputs to the servo


actuators. Three outputs of the computational string, e.g.


A, B, and 0, as shown in Figure 14, are compared at one time.


If one of these three strings, e.g. 5, varies a predetermined­

amount from the other two, then string D is substituted


instantaneously and automatically for B.
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ADVANCED COMPUTER SYSTEM


An advanced flight control system that was under


investiation for advanced fighter aircraft by McDonnell Douglas


is depicted in Figure 15. This figure shows how two comparison


points can be used in a computational end control electronic


string. One at the output of the actuators so that complete
 

strings are being compared and one at the output of ccmputational 
circuits so that an actuator is not lost due to a computational


fault. The voter (signal selector ) is- to 'be designed so that 
a failed input is never selected as the output of the voter. 
The c-cmpaators at the actuators measure pressure differential


between actuator outputs in a manner such that the failed string


can be detected. For example, if for comparator A-input IA1


does not compare with IA2 and for comparator B input IB1 does


not compare with 1B2 a failure in string none" is indicated.


The same type of ocmparator arrangement would be used to detect


.failures in string two, three and four.


Four control strings are used so that fail operational,


.fail operational, fail safe (FO/FO/FS) operation can be achieved


using only four comparators.


The'voters can use standard selection algorithms such as


select second from bottom value and middle value select.
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SHUTTLE MAIN EWfGI1E COCUTEE SYSTEM 
The current baseline consists of two digital computers


residing in each main engine controller. One controller is


dedicated to each of the main engines.


The redundant digital computers, for each main engine are


both acquiring and processing data in parallel; however, they


serve in a master and backup capacity. The output of the backup
 

computer is not in an active control mode but serves on a standby


capacity. A failure in the master will cause an automatic


switchover to the backup computet. A second failure will cause


the engine to shut down.


Since the two computers operate independently, except


during the switching period, the implementation techniques do


not appear to provide insight to the psychotic computer study


*problem area. \


'OR POOR
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SATUM V IRB'TRUKENTATION UNIT COMPUTER SYST-EI4 
The Saturn V Instrumentation Unit (IU) provides control to the 
three Saturn V booster stages. A single digital computer with 
duplex memory and triple modular redundancy is used. This


system has no criteria to deactivate a failed computer. The


failed computer would continue to operate and try to reinitialize.


The crew is not involved in any manual reconfiguration


procedures.


The Launch Vehicle Digital Computer (LV,0) shdwn in Figure


16 is a general purpose computer. The memory can be operated in 
either a simplex or duplex mode. In duplex operation memory 
modules are operated in pairs with the same data being stored 
in each module. Readout errors in one module are corrected by 
using data from its mate to restore the defective location. In 
simplex operation each module contains different data, whiCh


doubles the capacity of the memory. However, simplex operation


decreases the reliability of the LVDC because the ability to


correct readout errors is lost.


Computer reliability is increased-within the logic sections


by the use of triple modular redundancy. Within this redundancy


scheme, three separate logic paths are voted upon to correct


any errors which develop.


The Launch Vehicle Data Adapter/Launch Vehicle Digital


Computer (LVDA/LVDQ) receives the complement of the LVJA/LVDC
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command code after the flight sequence commsnd (bits I through


8Y has been picked ud by the input relays of the switch selectors.


This is indicated in Figure 17. The feedback (verification


informstion) is returned to the LVDA, and compared with the 
original code in the LVDC. If the feedback agrees, the 
LVDO/LVDA sends a read command to the switch selector. If the 
verification is not correct, a reset command is given (forced

reset), and the LVDO/LVDA reissues the 8-bit command in

complement form, on the 8 parallel lines indicated.

The Saturn V uses a parallel data bus system as indicated

in Figure 17.
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GROUND OO 4PUTER SYSTEMS 
This appendix briefly defines the three ground computer


systems investigated. These are the NASA JSC Mission Ccntrol Center 
(MOO), the NASA GSO remote site, and the NASA XSC Saturn Launch 
Vehicle (PAD 39) computer systems.


A. MOC Automated System


MOO - RTC: five ISM 56-75 comnuters for processing 
COATS: has four Univac 494 computers for interfacing 
with the Goddard network


o Two of each computer set is dedicated to a mission at the M00


o Two computers are active during critical mission


phases (launch, insertion, rendezvous)


o One is on-line; other is in dynamic standby mode 
o Both get the same inputs, however the outputs of the


standby are not used
 

o Computer status is letermined by console operator


o Switching criteria is judgemental using procedures


and console data


o anual switching only, with no automatic capability


available; msec timeframe (no data loss at MOR


consoles);, break-before-make switchover


* Computer/MOCR console interface is simplex data bus 
o MOO/Goddard interface (COATS) 
" Redundant lines; one active, one not used 
" Backup line carries test messages to verify readiness 
-99­
B. Remote Site Automqted System


'EMOTE SITES 
* Two omouters: One uplink (commands), one downlihk (data or TY)


o Dedicated by function, no redundancy 
" Realtime reconfiguration after failure, active computer 
does one function 
" Both computers can do-either function but not simultaneously. 
o Remote site/Goddard interface


* One line
 

* Realtime backup using alternste ".& BELL" lines 
C. XSC Saturn Launch Vehicle (PAD 39) Automated System 
* Two RCA 11OA compuiters: 1 in LT (Launch Umbilical Tower) 
1 in LCO (Launch Control Center) 
o Not redundant


* Two.LCO/LUT data buses: I active'(in line') 
1 passive


" Passive line verification at system turn-on


" Automatic switchover to the backup bus after two


unsuccessful attempts to transfer data (does not


switch back)


" Hardline (5 miles) backup for critical functions
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